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We Need to Talk About Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business Models, 
Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause 
Rebecca Giblin
*
 and Jane C. Ginsburg
**
 
 
Abstract 
Businesses are exploiting perceived gaps in the structure of copyright rights by 
ingeniously designing their technologies to fulfill demand for individual access 
through a structure of personalized copies and playback engineered in ways 
intended to implicate neither the public performance nor the reproduction rights. 
The archetypal example is Aereo Inc.’s system for providing online access to 
broadcast television. Aereo allows users to tune into individual antennae to 
stream TV to themselves, near-live, online. Aereo’s activities look a lot like the 
retransmission of broadcast signals, an activity which Congress has made very 
clear must result in remuneration for rightholders. However, Aereo’s careful 
design, which assigns each user her own antenna to generate an individual 
transmission copy from which she can access only the signals she could freely 
pick up from her own rooftop, means that it can also be argued that Aereo is 
simply enabling consumers to engage in legitimate non-remunerable uses. If the 
legality of this design is upheld by the Supreme Court this term, Aereo and 
subsequent comers will be able to offer consumers on-demand access to content, 
in a way that competes with licensed services, without any obligation to 
remunerate the rightholder.  
 
The implications of these business models are significant: in the case of audio and 
audiovisual works, for example, the on-demand access market may soon exceed 
the value of the retention copy-based market. When some participants are 
licensed but their competitors are not, the imbalance may provoke licensees to 
revise or forego their agreements.  More generally, opportunistic engineering 
choices that obscure some courts’ perceptions of the impact on the on-demand 
access market risk removing evolving markets from the scope of copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights.  Businesses that free-ride on copyrighted works also 
obtain an unfair competitive advantage over copyright licensees.  The authors of 
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this paper approach copyright from very different perspectives, but are united in 
the view that it is undesirable for legal outcomes to depend so heavily on 
technical design.   
 
This article addresses the U.S. caselaw that encouraged businesses such as Aereo 
to design technologies that could rival or even displace copyright-remunerative 
modes of making works of authorship available to the public.  We consider the 
implications for copyright owners were Aereo and its supporters to succeed in 
their reading of the Copyright Act, as well as the implications for other 
technologies, particularly those involving “cloud” storage, were the broadcasters 
to prevail.  Finally, each author offers her own analysis to demonstrate how it is 
possible to read the U.S. Copyright Act’s transmit clause in a way that does not 
make technological design determine the outcome. Either one of our readings, 
we argue, enables copyright’s exclusive rights to remain effective without 
discouraging technological innovation. 
 
Introduction 
Copyright has long focused on copies, starting, in common law countries, from the 1710 Statute 
of Anne’s sole rights to print, publish and sell.  Copyright’s other principal exclusive right, the 
public performance right, later (in the U.K. and the U.S.) joined the reproduction right to cover 
most forms of exploitation of works of authorship.  Deriving from distinct enactments, these 
rights often were administered separately, and both business practice and legal rules reinforced 
the borders between the regimes of rights.  Digital media have now largely blurred those 
boundaries and their attendant commercial consequences.  Business models and consumer 
expectations are shifting from providing and possessing copies to enjoying access to the 
content of works of authorship online.  The right of communication to the public, or (in U.S. 
copyright terminology) of public performance or display by transmission, thus becomes a much 
more significant copyright prerogative.  
As our consumption of creative works shifts to accessing digital works online, some 
commentators have warned of the potential for copyright to intrude too far, triggering 
copyright owner claims to control all acts, public or private, that follow on from the initial, 
perhaps ephemeral, digital copy, in effect extending the Copyright Act’s enumerated rights into 
a general “use” right, or, as Jessica Litman feared, into an “exclusive right to read.”
1
  Recent 
developments, however, have taken an ironic turn: where ephemeral copies once seemed to 
offer copyright owners a hook to draw in even private enjoyment of copyrighted works, now 
                                                           
1
  Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); see also J.H. Spoor, 
"The Copyright Approach to Copying on the Internet:  (Over) Stretching the Reproduction Right?", in THE 
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 67-79 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The 
New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998). 
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temporary copies foster an opposite variety of overreaching.  They serve as the fulcrum for the 
copyright-avoiding business models of for-profit enterprises that make others’ content 
available for consumer enjoyment. Businesses are exploiting perceived gaps in the structure of 
copyright rights by ingeniously designing their technologies to fulfill demand for individual 
access through a structure of personalized copies and playback engineered in ways intended to 
implicate neither the public performance nor the reproduction rights. The archetypal example 
is Aereo Inc.’s system for providing online access to broadcast television. Aereo allows users to 
tune into individual antennae to stream TV to themselves, near-live, online. Aereo’s activities 
look a lot like the retransmission of broadcast signals, an activity which Congress has made very 
clear must result in remuneration for rightholders. However, Aereo’s careful design, which 
assigns each user her own antenna to generate an individual transmission copy from which she 
can access only the signals she could freely pick up from her own rooftop, means that it can 
also be argued that Aereo is simply enabling consumers to engage in legitimate non-
remunerable uses. If the legality of this design is upheld by the Supreme Court this term, Aereo 
and subsequent comers will be able to offer consumers on-demand access to content, in a way 
that competes with licensed services, without any obligation to remunerate the rightholder.  
The implications of these business models are significant: in the case of audio and audiovisual 
works, for example, the on-demand access market may soon exceed the value of the retention 
copy-based market. When some participants are licensed but their competitors are not, the 
imbalance may provoke licensees to revise or forego their agreements.  More generally, 
opportunistic engineering choices that obscure some courts’ perceptions of the impact on the 
on-demand access market risk removing evolving markets from the scope of copyright owners’ 
exclusive rights.  Businesses that free-ride on copyrighted works also obtain an unfair 
competitive advantage over copyright licensees.  The authors of this paper approach copyright 
from very different perspectives, but are united in the view that it is undesirable for legal 
outcomes to depend so heavily on technical design.   
This article addresses the U.S. caselaw that encouraged businesses such as Aereo to design 
technologies that could rival or even displace copyright-remunerative modes of making works 
of authorship available to the public.  We consider the implications for copyright owners were 
Aereo and its supporters to succeed in their reading of the Copyright Act, as well as the 
implications for other technologies, particularly those involving “cloud” storage, were the 
broadcasters to prevail.  Finally, each author offers her own analysis to demonstrate how it is 
possible to read the U.S. Copyright Act’s transmit clause in a way that does not make 
technological design determine the outcome. Either one of our readings, we argue, enables 
copyright’s exclusive rights to remain effective without discouraging technological innovation.   
  
4 
 
Aereo: technological design and legal arguments 
Aereo, Inc., launched its online television service in 2012. Tapping into perceived consumer 
frustration with high cable prices and inflexible “bundling” models,
2
 it enables individuals to 
access recorded broadcast content over the internet, from computers and mobile devices, in a 
way that obviates consumers’ need for any physical recording device – or even a TV set. 
Subscribers can use Aereo’s technology to watch broadcast television either near-live or at their 
later convenience from a variety of internet-connected screens, including phones and tablets. 
By adding geographic and temporal flexibility while still preserving the ability to watch TV live, 
Aereo  provides what for many users is a better-than-perfect substitute for live TV viewership.
3
 
The technology works by combining thousands of thumbnail-sized, independently-functioning 
antennas with cloud-based recording and storage functionality.
4
 The system is based around 
copies, which are made regardless of whether a subscriber requests to ‘watch’ a broadcast (for 
near-live viewing) or ‘record’ it (for future consumption). When a subscriber launches a request 
for either service, by clicking on a program in the electronic programming guide that Aereo 
offers its customers, Aereo’s servers allocate a personal antenna and transcoder to the 
requesting user.
5
 The servers then instruct the antenna to tune in to the relevant broadcast 
frequency and create a new directory in which to store the recording.
6
 Since users are typically 
assigned a new antenna for each transaction, many individuals access the same antenna over 
time.
7
 However, no two users are ever assigned the same antenna simultaneously, and 
recordings made while an antenna is assigned to a particular user are never available to any 
other subscriber.
8
 This system means that, if 10,000 users all request the same program to be 
recorded, 10,000 antennas will separately tune in to it, and unique copies will be made for 
each.
9
 If a user has selected ‘watch’, the recording will be discarded once she finishes watching 
(unless she chooses to keep it); ‘recorded’ programs will not be automatically discarded.
10
 
                                                           
2
  Jeff John Roberts, Aereo’s big bet to break the TV industry: CEO Chet Kanojia explains, GIGAOM (Feb. 7, 2013, 
1:14 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/02/07/aereos-big-bet-to-break-the-tv-industry-ceo-chet-kanojia-explains/. 
3
  Aereo emphasizes this in a press release, announcing: “Now you have the gift of portability. And when it comes 
to sports, the only thing better than portability is LIVE access . . . and there is no arguing that sports are best 
live.” Gaining Yards, AEREO (Feb. 24, 2012), http://blog.aereo.com/2012/02/aereo-football/. 
4
  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that each antenna 
functioned independently). This finding was not appealed. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 
680 (2d Cir. 2013).  
5
  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
6
  Id. at 378. 
7
  Note however that users with ‘static’ subscriptions are generally assigned the same antennas on an ongoing 
basis. See id. at 377-78 
8
  Id.  at 378. 
9
  It appears that three different copies of each program are actually made, of different quality, allowing users to 
choose the one best suited to the internet connection they’re using. Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13–
11649–NMG, 2013 WL 5604284, at *1 (D. Mass Oct. 8, 2013). 
10
  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
5 
 
Users of either method are able to commence playback of the recording as it is being made, 
and the recording enables them to pause and rewind ‘live’ broadcasts.
11
 
Viewed in technical isolation, Aereo’s design looks clumsy and wasteful. Why utilize thousands 
of antennae and copies when just one of each could achieve the same end? Why make copies 
at all for subscribers who simply want to watch a program live? Viewed through the lens of 
recent judicial interpretation of the U.S. copyright law however, the design comes into focus as 
logical and even rather elegant. Aereo’s service implicates two of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights – those concerning reproduction and public performance.  Network broadcasts 
are free for consumers to access, but cable television providers are obliged to license the rights 
to retransmit them to their subscribers, delivering billions in revenue to broadcasters.  Aereo 
has sought to exploit the contours of the existing law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Sony and the Second Circuit in Cablevision,
12
 in an attempt to look like a tool for facilitating 
legitimate consumer uses rather than resembling a cable retransmitter. If Aereo’s attempt to 
design its technology to fall outside the copyright owners’ exclusive rights is successful, it will 
avoid the obligation to compensate rightholders for these uses. In recognition of the 
seriousness of this threat to the broadcast and cable models, broadcasters have waged legal 
battles against Aereo across the First, Second and Tenth Circuits, and against a copycat 
technology in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari regarding the 
Second Circuit’s finding that Aereo does not infringe the public performance right; it heard oral 
arguments on April 22, 2014, and is expected to decide by the end of June.  
What makes the law vulnerable to Aereo’s challenge? 
The challenges posed by Aereo and its ilk relate to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights of 
reproduction and public performance.
13
  
The reproduction right 
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) grants copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce their works in 
copies or phonorecords. Copies of broadcasts are made when users instruct Aereo’s system 
that they wish to “watch” or “record” a show. Aereo argues that these copies are made by 
                                                           
11
  Id. at 377. 
12
  Defendant’s Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 1, WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1543, 12-Civ.-1540), 2012 WL 3019466 (“Aereo merely provides the Aereo Technology that 
consumers may use to do what they are legally entitled to do: (1) access free and legally accessible over-the-air 
television broadcasts using an antenna [see 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.] (2) create individual, unique recordings of 
those broadcasts for personal use, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984); and (3) record and play back those unique recordings utilizing a remotely-located digital video recorder 
(“DVR”) to personal devices. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).”) 
13
  See 17 USC § 106. The case against Aereo more broadly claims that it has engaged in direct infringement of the 
public performance and reproduction rights, and contributory infringement. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 
874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, these claims have not yet proceeded to judgment. 
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consumers and amount to unremunerable fair uses in accordance with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1984 holding that consumer uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast 
television programming are lawful.
14
  
 
The public performance right 
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) grants the copyright owner in motion pictures and various other works the 
exclusive right to publicly perform them. 
The Copyright Act defines “perform” as “to recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], either 
directly or by means of any device or process, or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”
15
 The Second Circuit has ruled that a performance must be “simultaneously 
perceptible,” and thus has distinguished delivery of a download from a stream.
16
  In the latter 
instance, the user sees and/or hears the work as it is being communicated to her; in the former, 
she will not experience the work’s contents unless she subsequently summons the work from 
her computer’s memory. 
The Act also defines “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’” in relevant part as:  
by transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . to 
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.
17
 
This provision, known as the ‘transmit clause’, generally applies to electronic transmissions. To 
“transmit” a performance or display of the work is defined as meaning “to communicate it by 
any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which 
they are sent.”
18
 “Devices” and “processes” expressly include those that were developed after 
the law came into effect.
19
  
The Cablevision Precedent 
                                                           
14
  See Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, (Mar. 26, 2014), 2014 WL 
1245459, at *36-37; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
15
  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, current through P.L. 113-66). 
16
 U.S. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).  
17
  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, current through P.L. 113-66). 
18
  Id. 
19
  Id. 
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Aereo built its system in reliance on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the transmit clause in 
Cartoon Networks v CSC Holdings. That litigation arose from the March 2006 announcement of 
cable TV provider Cablevision that it would release a ‘Remote Storage DVR System’ (RS-DVR).
20
 
The earliest consumer timeshifting technologies were Video Tape or Video Cassette Recorders 
(VCRs). These devices received broadcast signals, recorded them onto magnetic tape and then 
converted them to enable viewing on TVs.
21
 This technology evolved into Digital Video 
Recorders (DVRs), which worked in a similar way, except that they recorded onto hard drives 
instead of magnetic tape. Cablevision’s RS-DVR essentially worked the same way as a regular 
DVR, but rather than recording the programming onto the hard disk of a device in the 
consumer’s home, Cablevision’s automated service would record it onto a hard disk on one of 
its central servers.
22
 Customers would be allocated storage space, and the recordings “would be 
stored in that hard drive space and available only to that customer.”
23
 The system permitted 
customers to record from any channel within their subscription,
24
 and they could do so by 
either scheduling a future program via Cablevision’s electronic program guide, or by simply 
pressing “record” during the one currently showing on the screen.
25
  
Before it introduced the RS-DVR system, Cablevision immediately retransmitted the data it 
received from networks to subscribers.
26
 Once it introduced the RS-DVR system however, that 
single stream of data would be “split” into two.
27
 One stream would be immediately 
retransmitted to customers just as before, and the other would ultimately flow to a server 
which would check whether any subscribers had requested any of the programs within it to be 
recorded. If so, a copy would be made from this stream and ultimately stored on the hard drive 
partition associated with that particular customer.
28
 
The system’s design resulted in a separate recording being made and stored for each subscriber 
who requested one.
29
 “[I]f 1000 customers want to record a specific episode of HBO’s ‘The 
                                                           
20
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
21
  See Sony, supra note 12. 
22
  Detailed descriptions of the Cablevision RS-DVR are set out at Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536, 536 F.3d 121, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2008). 
23
  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(citations omitted). 
24
  Id. at 613, 614.  The court observed that Cablevision controlled the universe of programming available to 
subscribers to its remote DVR service: “As for programming content, Cablevision determines the programming 
that will be available for recording with the RS-DVR. In other words, an RS-DVR subscriber would only be able 
to record programming made available by Cablevision. Cablevision has elected to make all 170 channels 
received by Cablevision available to RS-DVR subscribers, but that is Cablevision's decision.'’ Id. at 613 
(citations omitted). 
25
  Id. at 614.  
26
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
27
  Id. at 124. 
28
  Id. at 124-25. 
29
  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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Wire,’ 1000 separate copies of that episode are made, each copy uniquely associated by 
identifiers with the set-top box of the requesting customer.”
30
  
To play the recordings, a customer could select the desired program using her remote control, 
and the recording stored on her portion of the central hard disk would be streamed to her 
television via her cable set-top box.
31
 The system did not allow the recordings to be copied to 
local drives or to videotape, although traditional “local storage” DVRs typically include those 
features.
32
  
While the system was analogous to stand-alone DVR technology, all recording took place at the 
location of Cablevision’s servers, thus dispensing the consumer from mastering or even 
acquiring any recording devices.  As a result, the time-shifting that the service enabled also 
resembled a video on demand service.
33
 The principal difference between the two technologies 
was that programs accessed via the RS-DVR had to be requested to be recorded in advance of 
their airtime, whereas video on demand content does not.
34
  In essence the RS-DVR required 
two clicks, one to reserve the content in advance of its broadcast, and a later one to play it, 
while video on demand typically needs only one, at the time of playback.
35
 
Cablevision obtained no licenses for these activities and contended that it was under no 
obligation to do so.
36
 Rightholders disagreed, arguing that Cablevision would infringe their 
rights by making copies of their works, in violation of their exclusive right to reproduce the 
work in copies, and by making unauthorized transmissions to the public, contrary to their 
exclusive right to publicly perform their audiovisual works.
37
 By the time the product was 
announced, many cable companies (including Cablevision) already offered their customers set-
top boxes that added DVR functionality to their subscriptions,
38
 and none had been sued for 
doing so.
39
 However, rightholders apparently saw the new development of “remote” storage 
and transmission as a much greater threat. A number of them instituted litigation seeking an 
injunction prohibiting its distribution.
40
 Notably, the parties reached a deal to leave certain 
                                                           
30
  Id. at 615. 
31
  Id. at 615-16. 
32
  Id.  
33
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2008). 
34
  Id. at 125. 
35
 As a result, in the digital environment the difference between time-shifting and pay-per-view is increasingly 
evanescent. 
36
  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
37
  Id. at 617. 
38
  Id. at 611-12. 
39
  Id. at 619. Note that copyright owners’ forbearance from suing the cable companies does not imply any 
concession that the companies’ activities were lawful. 
40
  Id. at 609.  
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issues off the table: the plaintiffs did not claim secondary infringement, and in exchange, 
Cablevision waived any defenses based on its customers’ possible fair use.
41
 
There was no dispute that performances were occurring as part of the Cablevision process, but 
the parties disagreed about who performed them, and whether or not they were public.  
Cablevision’s contention that the performances were not public turned on its assertion that the 
source copies for the individual transmissions had been “made” by the subscribers and that, 
because each playback transmission was launched from each user’s private copy, the 
performances too could only be private. 
At trial, Judge Chin (sitting prior to his elevation to the Second Circuit) found that Cablevision’s 
involvement in the process was sufficient to justify a finding that it made the copies stored on 
its servers as well as the transmissions from those copies, and that the transmissions were 
“public” within the meaning of the Act.
42
 In his view, Cablevision’s ongoing and active 
involvement in the copying process, and its determination of the content that is available for 
recording, meant that Cablevision was “doing” the copying.
43
 He ruled that “the plain language” 
of the transmit clause mandated rejection of Cablevision’s argument that its use of unique 
copies prevented the transmissions from being “public”: “a transmission ‘to the public’ is a 
public performance, even if members of the public receive the transmission at separate places 
at different times. Such is the case here.”
44
  
He further held that transmissions are “public” where the relationship between the sending 
and receiving parties is a commercial one.
45
   
The Second Circuit reversed.  It determined that the copies, albeit created using Cablevision’s 
facilities, and stored on its servers, were “made” by the subscribers who selected the programs 
from among the offerings proposed by Cablevision.
46
  In reaching this decision the Court 
approvingly cited Netcom, a 1995 decision in which a district court declined to hold an ISP 
directly liable when its facilities automatically reproduced a copyrighted work that had been 
posted by one of its users.
47
 That court reasoned that, despite copyright infringement’s strict 
liability standard, “there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking 
                                                           
41
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
42
  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
43
  Id. at 617-21. 
44
  Id. at 622-23. 
45
  Id. at 623 (citing On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 
1991)). 
46
  Before determining who “makes” the copies stored on the Cablevision servers, the Second Circuit ruled that the 
“buffer” copies that Cablevision made in the process of delivering the content from its real-time signal to its 
subscribers’ storage boxes on its servers were not be sufficiently ‘fixed’ in the buffers to amount to copies. See 
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 127-30 (2d Cir. 2008). 
47
  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal 1995). 
10 
 
where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”
48
 The Fourth 
Circuit had subsequently endorsed that distinction in a case involving an internet service 
provider hosting third-party postings,
49
 and here the Second Circuit did too, albeit in a different 
factual context. The Second Circuit found that Netcom rationally directed attention “to the 
volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.”
50
 Reviewing Cablevision’s service, the 
Second Circuit found two instances of volitional conduct: “Cablevision’s conduct in designing, 
housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct 
in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program.”
51
 Although the precedent on 
which it relied concerned services that further transmitted content whose initial 
communication originated with their subscribers, the Second Circuit did not address this 
distinction, nor did it consider whether Cablevision’s initial provision of the content constituted 
a “volitional” act.  Rather, it limited its focus to acts subsequent to Cablevision’s offer of the 
programming for remote recording.  The Court reasoned that, in the case of a VCR, it would be 
“the person who actually presses the button to make the recording . . . [who] supplies the 
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from 
the operator, owns the machine.”
52
 In considering the extent to which Cablevision was 
analogous to a physical photocopying shop, the Court’s reasoning would prove crucial for 
future technology providers:  
In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference exists between 
making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying 
system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which 
automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.
53
  
On that basis, the Court found that “Cablevision more closely resembles a store proprietor who 
charges customers to use a photocopier on his premises” than a proprietor whose employees 
actually make the copies.
54
 While Cablevision’s discretion over the programming that could be 
recorded made its conduct “more proximate” to the creation of an illegal copy, it was not 
enough to justify a finding that Cablevision was a “maker” of the copies.
55
  
In refusing to find Cablevision made the copies, the Second Circuit seemed concerned with 
“maintain[ing] a meaningful distinction between direct and contributory copyright 
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infringement,” something it found to have been intended by both the Supreme Court and by 
Congress.
56
 It declined to decide whether a defendant’s “contribution to the creation of an 
infringing copy may be so great that it warrants holding that party directly liable for the 
infringement, even though another party has actually made the copy”, but found that was not 
the case here.
57
 Instead, any copies made via the RS-DVR system would be “made” by the 
individual customer.
58
  In essence, the court found no substantive difference between supplying 
a free-standing recording device that a user operates at home and supplying a remote digital 
recording system that the user operates from home. 
Having determined that the customers “made” the copies using Cablevision’s instrumentalities, 
the Second Circuit then considered whether a transmission of a performance from the 
customer’s individual source copy could be a “public” performance.  It first had to identify the 
“performance” referred to by the transmit clause. This has been the subject of a great deal of 
controversy, stemming largely from a perceived grammatical ambiguity within the text. By 
stating that ‘[t]o perform . . . a work “publicly” means . . . to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public’, the statute defines the act of 
transmitting a performance as one type of performing, even though the terms “to perform” 
and “to transmit” are separately defined as well. This creates uncertainty as to whether the 
relevant performance is the performance created by the act of the transmission, as Cablevision 
argued, or the performance of the underlying work, the position taken by the broadcaster 
plaintiffs.   
The Second Circuit ultimately held that, in the context of transmitting a performance to the 
public, Congress was referring “to the performance created by the act of transmission.”
59
 
Having accepted that the transmission was the relevant performance, the Second Circuit then 
considered which members of the public were capable of receiving that performance. Hence 
the dispositive significance of the unique copies made and transmitted to each user:  
[I]t seems quite consistent with the Act to treat a transmission made using Copy A as 
distinct from one made using Copy B, just as we would treat a transmission made by 
Cablevision as distinct from an otherwise identical transmission made by Comcast. Both 
factors – the identity of the transmitter and the source material of the transmission – 
limit the potential audience of a transmission in this case and are therefore germane in 
determining whether that transmission is made “to the public.”
60
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On the facts of Cablevision, “each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber using a 
copy made by that subscriber”, which means the audience of each transmission is just one 
individual.
61
 The Second Circuit then concluded that must mean that the relevant performances 
were not “to the public”.
62
   
The broadcasters sought certiorari, but the Solicitor General, albeit acknowledging flaws in the 
Second Circuit’s analysis, recommended against the grant: “although scattered language in the 
Second Circuit’s decision could be read to endorse overly broad, and incorrect, propositions 
about the Copyright Act, the court of appeals was careful to tie its actual holdings to the facts of 
this case. The petition for a writ of certiorari therefore should be denied.”
63
 The amicus brief of 
the United States also argued that the parties’ agreement not to litigate the critical secondary 
liability and fair use issues made the case “an unsuitable vehicle for clarifying the proper 
application of copyright principles to technologies like the one at issue here.”
64
 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
65
   
Cablevision is crucial to understanding why Aereo’s technological design is not just logical, but 
perhaps even inevitable. Simply, it appears to instruct technology providers that, if they design 
their systems to enable each user to make a single copy for herself, that structure could, in 
appropriate cases, effectively immunize the services from any liability under both the 
reproduction and the public performance rights. Although the Second Circuit expressly 
cautioned that its holding “d[id] not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all 
copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy 
with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their 
own individual copies,”
66
 the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Aereo demonstrates that 
this admonition did not in fact confine that court’s reading of the statute.    
Aereo: The Second Circuit follows its Cablevision roadmap 
Aereo responded to the broadcasters’ infringement claim by countering that it was not publicly 
performing the broadcast programming because, under Cablevision, the relevant audience is 
the audience of each transmission, and thus that its performances are non-public: like 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR, “its system creates unique, user-requested copies that are transmitted 
only to the particular user that created them.”
67
  The district court and a majority of the Second 
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Circuit on appeal, in analyses that focused closely on the technical similarities between Aereo 
and Cablevision’s RS-DVR, held for Aereo. The district court described the systems as being 
“materially identical,” “suggesting that the copies Aereo creates are as significant as those 
created in Cablevision.”
68
 Indeed, it suggested that the copies made by Aereo were even more 
independent than those made by Cablevision, because they were each created from a separate 
stream of data.
69
 By 2-1 majority, the Second Circuit confirmed this reasoning on appeal. It 
reiterated its view that “the relevant inquiry under the Transmit Clause is the potential 
audience of a particular transmission, not the potential audience for the underlying work or the 
particular performance of that work being transmitted.”
70
 It also held that there were “two 
essential facts” which led to the holding that Cablevision’s transmissions were not public 
performances: that its RS-DVR allowed each subscriber to create unique copies of each 
program, and that the transmission of the recording to a subscriber was from that unique 
copy.
71
 These features meant that “the potential audience of every RS-DVR transmission was 
only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the subscriber who created the copy,” and that 
limitation meant that the transmission was not “to the public”.
72
 Aereo’s system had those 
same two features.
73
     
The majority rejected several proposed distinctions from Cablevision.  That Cablevision had paid 
license fees for the initial retransmission (but not the RS-DVR service), while Aereo was paying 
nothing was irrelevant since, if Aereo was not publicly performing the televised content, no 
license was required.
74
   By the same token, the Cablevision holding could not be confined to 
technologies analogous to VCRs. Although the broadcasters argued that Aereo’s provision of 
near-live television programming was distinguishable from Cablevision’s service because 
Cablevision’s “RS-DVR copies ‘broke the continuous chain of retransmission to the public’ in a 
way that Aereo’s copies do not,”
75
 the majority rejected the time-shifting/on-demand 
streaming distinction for two reasons. First, it found that the copies made via the Aereo 
technology had the same legal significance as the copies at issue in Cablevision because, unlike 
the case with internet streaming, users didn’t just choose what they wanted to watch, they 
exercised volitional control over how and when that content was played.
76
 “This second layer of 
control, exercised after the copy has been created, means that Aereo’s transmissions from the 
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recorded copies cannot be regarded as simply one link in a chain of transmission.”
77
 Second, 
the majority found that, even if the transmission did travel uninterruptedly from the user’s 
assigned antenna to the user without any copy being made, the transmission still would not be 
public:  
It is beyond dispute that the transmission of a broadcast TV program received by an 
individual’s rooftop antenna to the TV in his living room is private, because only that 
individual can receive the transmission from that antenna, ensuring that the potential 
audience of that transmission is only one person. Plaintiffs have presented no reason 
why the result should be any different when that rooftop antenna is rented from Aereo 
and its signals transmitted over the internet: it remains the case that only one person 
can receive that antenna’s transmissions. Thus even without the creation of user-
associated copies, which under Cablevision means that Aereo’s transmissions are not 
public, there is significant reason to believe that Aereo’s system would not be creating 
public performances, since the entire chain of transmission from the time a signal is first 
received by Aereo to the time it generates an image the Aereo user sees has a potential 
audience of only one Aereo customer.
78
  
Finally, rejecting the contention that, to hold that Aereo’s transmissions were not public 
performances would be to “exalt[] form over substance, because the Aereo system is 
functionally equivalent to a cable television provider,”
79
 the majority rejoined, ‘”[T]hat Aereo 
was able to design a system based on Cablevision’s holding to provide its users with nearly live 
television over the internet is an argument that Cablevision was wrongly decided; it does not 
provide a basis for distinguishing Cablevision.”
80
 It noted that many other technology providers, 
particularly cloud computing services, have also designed their systems around Cablevision’s 
holdings. “Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the technical 
details of a particular system and more on its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held 
that technical architecture matters.”
81
 Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish 
between public and private transmissions than when Congress enacted the transmit clause in 
1976, the majority ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as previously interpreted 
in Cablevision, dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions were not public 
performances.
82
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Re-Examining the Transmit Clause: Text and Legislative History  
 
The Second Circuit’s  conclusion that the relevant performance under the transmit clause is the 
particular transmission of the performance of the work both truncates the scope of the public 
performance right and makes the determination of a public performance all too vulnerable to 
technological manipulation.  When one adds in the Second Circuit’s “particular transmission” 
interpolation, the clause effectively reads: 
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—  
. . . 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a [particular transmission of a] performance 
or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the [particular transmission of a] 
performance or display receive [the particular transmission] in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
If the “it” in the unadulterated text of the definition is construed to mean a particular 
transmission of the performance of a work, and only one person can receive this transmission 
because it derives from an individualized source copy, then, according to the Second Circuit, the 
transmission is private.  The interpolation of “particular transmission,” however, cannot be 
confined to individualized source copies.  If one is going to interpret “a performance of a work” 
as meaning “a particular transmission of a performance of a work” then “a performance of a 
work” must mean “a particular transmission of a performance of a work” throughout the 
“transmit clause.”  But consistent application of the Second Circuit’s interpolation not only 
turns the first phrase of the definition into a tautology (“to transmit . . . a [particular 
transmission]”)
83
, but also would lead to a finding of a “private” performance whenever only 
one person can receive that transmission, regardless of the source of the transmission.  The 
Second Circuit attempted to give meaning to the statute’s clear intention to cover 
asynchronous transmissions by stating that individualized transmissions could be aggregated 
into a public performance if they emanated from a shared source copy (though not if they 
proceeded from multiple individual copies).
84
 But the Second Circuit’s reading of the statute in 
fact provides no support for this distinction: the source of a “particular transmission” does not 
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make it any less “particular.”  Thus, if the individualized transmissions are asynchronous, then 
no member of the public can receive the particular transmission, because, by definition, the 
transmissions that go out at different times cannot be the same transmissions.   
Clever engineering can confer even more anomalous results on the “particular transmission” 
interpolation.  The “transmit clause” covers transmissions of performances separated not only 
in time (now potentially read out of the statute), but also separated in space.  Suppose that the 
transmission entity, rather than sending out a single transmission simultaneously captured by 
multiple recipients in multiple places, simultaneously communicated a dedicated transmission 
to each recipient.  In that case, no member of the public would be “capable of receiving” the 
same particular transmission because each transmission will have been personalized.  Of 
course, the members of the public would be “capable of receiving” a transmission of a 
performance of the work, but only one member of the public is “capable of receiving” the 
particular transmission of that performance. Thus, this reading’s focus on the “particular 
transmission” leads to outcomes dictated by technological design, rather than by the nature of 
the use or of the public to which the use is directed.   
An interpretation more consonant with the statutory text (but, as we shall see, not completely 
problem-free) identifies the relevant “performance” transmitted to members of the public as 
the performance of the underlying work. A reading free of the “particular transmission” 
interpolation cannot be manipulated in the ways just explored, because it is irrelevant under 
this reading whether the members of the public receive the performance of the work from 
multiple individual transmissions emanating from a single source copy, or from multiple 
individual transmissions derived from multiple individual source copies.  District courts in the 
Ninth, Tenth and DC circuits have followed this approach in applying the transmit clause to 
Aereo and a copycat competitor.
85
 Judge Chin (who had been the district judge in Cablevision) 
also adopted it in his dissents from the Second Circuit’s panel decision in Aereo, and from the 
subsequent rejection of the petition for rehearing en banc. In his panel dissent, Judge Chin 
characterized the technical architecture as “a sham”: 
The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no 
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than 
one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-
engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage 
of a perceived loophole in the law.
 86
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In his view, “a transmission to anyone other than oneself or an intimate relation is a 
communication to a ‘member[] of the public,” because it is not in any sense “private.”
87
 Thus, 
Aereo’s transmissions were “to the public” because they were being disseminated to “paying 
strangers”, and the restriction of the potential audience of each transmission to a single 
member of the public should make no difference.
88
  By accepting Aereo’s argument that 
Aereo’s design prevented it from falling within the public performance right, “the majority 
elevate[d] form over substance,”
89
 and “provide[d] a blueprint for others to avoid the Copyright 
Act’s licensing regime altogether.”
90
    
As Judge Chin further argued in his dissent from the Second Circuit’s refusal to grant en banc 
review, the “plain meaning” of the transmit clause supported his analysis: 
The system is a ‘device or process,’ which Aereo uses first to receive copyrighted images 
and sounds and then to transmit them to its subscribers ‘beyond the place’ from which 
they are sent,’ that is, beyond the point of origination. Its subscribers are strangers—
paying ‘members of the public’—and under the statute, it matters not whether they are 
receiving the images ‘in the same place or in separate places, [or] at the same time or at 
different times.’ Under any reasonable construction of the statute, Aereo is performing 
the broadcasts publicly as it is transmitting copyrighted works ‘to the public.’ Therefore, 
Aereo is committing copyright infringement within the plain meaning of the statute.
91
 
In this second dissent, Judge Chin also contended that the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Cablevision “erroneously conflated the phrase ‘performance or display’ with the term 
‘transmission’,” thus incorrectly shifting the focus of the inquiry “from whether the 
transmitter’s audience receives the same content to whether it receives the same 
transmission.”
92
 His parsing of the statute led him to the conclusion that “there is no indication 
Congress meant anything other than what it said: the public must be capable of receiving the 
performance or display, not the transmission.”
93
 He also criticized his colleagues for treating 
transmissions made from the same copy of a work differently than those made from separate 
copies. “Perhaps when it was more costly to make copies, the use of a unique copy could limit a 
transmitter’s potential audience, but advancements in technology have rendered such 
reasoning obsolete.”
94
 Even if that was still the case however, he found no intention by 
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Congress for “the definition to turn on whether a unique copy was used.”
95
 He further found no 
basis in the statute for a requirement that each individual transmission must be able to reach 
the public. “Based on the plain language, it is sufficient if the actor is ‘transmit[ting]’ the same 
performance or display and his recipients are members of the public.”
96
    
 The view that the relevant performance is the performance of the underlying work also gains 
support from the legislative history that led to the adoption of the transmit clause in its current 
form, a history which is particularly striking when considered against Aereo’s business model. 
Revisions to the public performance right in the 1976 Act were largely driven by Supreme Court 
decisions in the cases of Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
97
 and Teleprompter 
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
98
 Those decisions found that community antenna 
television providers, who mounted antennae in locations which received strong television 
signals and then retransmitted them to paying subscribers located elsewhere, were not liable 
for infringement because those transmissions did not amount to legally relevant performances. 
The definitions of “perform” and “publicly” were subsequently revised “specifically to render 
the CATV systems’ unlicensed retransmissions illegal.”
99
 Given that “cable systems are 
commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of 
copyrighted program material”, the House Committee considered that “copyright royalties 
should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such programs.”
100
 However, it found that 
making cable providers negotiate individually with rightholders would be “impractical and 
unduly burdensome”, and established a compulsory license system to set the fees for 
retransmission royalties.
101
  
The legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned to ensure that the revised 
legislation would be broad and technologically neutral. Thus, it explained, 
The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and 
combinations of wires and wireless communications media, including but by no means 
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method 
by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and 
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conveyed is a ‘transmission,’ and if the transmission reaches the public in [any] form, the 
case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.
102
 
Moreover, Congress foresaw “the case of sounds or images stored in an information system 
and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual members of the 
public.”
103
  Congress thus anticipated the exploitation of copyrighted works by digital on-
demand enterprises, and sought to bring those markets within the copyright owners’ exclusive 
rights of public performance and display. 
 
Implications of the Competing Interpretations 
The preceding pages addressed different interpretations of the “transmit clause.” This section 
now more fully explores the implications of those competing interpretations.  
The interpretations clash principally in their characterization of the relevant “performance,” 
and “the public” that is capable of receiving it.  Under the Second Circuit’s view, the consumer’s 
creation of an intermediate source copy for the transmission means that the communication of 
the work from that individualized copy to a particular recipient cannot be “to the public.”  The 
relevant question is:  who is the audience for a particular transmission of the performance of 
the work?  The contrary interpretation disregards the intermediate copies as spurious (and in 
any event not “made” by the consumer), and instead considers whether a communication of 
the performance of the work was offered to the public.  It posits that the subsequent 
individualized receipt by members of the public of particular transmissions, far from removing 
the transmission from the ambit of a “public performance,” comes squarely within the 
statutory definition.   
Implications of Aereo’s interpretation 
If Aereo’s interpretation prevails, it would provide a blueprint for other service providers to 
design their services in ways that fall outside copyright owners’ exclusive rights.  
Technology providers who create unique copies of protected works at a user’s request, and 
then transmit them to those users from those copies, would likely be immunized from any 
finding of public performance infringement, notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent, expressed 
in broad, technology-neutral language, that the transmit clause cover activities similar to those 
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engaged in by Aereo. This immunity would result from the design of the technology, without 
any scope to consider the purpose of the use.   
Not all businesses would be able to take advantage of the Aereo blueprint. In most cases, a 
combination of several crucial factors must exist for Aereo to provide them with a liability-
avoiding model: 
1. The businesses must be able to obtain access to the desired content without having to 
seek authorization from rightholders, for example via broadcast over public airwaves. If 
the businesses must instead acquire the desired content from the rightholders, they will 
be obliged to obtain licences for it.  
2. The audience “capable of receiving the transmission” must be limited, probably by 
making individual copies available to unique subscribers and then transmitting those on 
request. Thus, a video on demand service which holds open a library of copyrighted 
content available to anyone willing to pay will still be liable even if the transmission is 
individualized, so long as the source copy for the transmission is centralized.  
3. Any individual copies that are made must not themselves be infringing, otherwise 
liability will accrue regardless of whether the transmission is public or private. 
Businesses like Aereo and Cablevision rely heavily on the assumption that the copies are 
“made” by the user (see point 4, infra), and would, at least for the free-to-air broadcasts 
in Aereo, amount to fair use for the purpose of timeshifting.  
4. Any copies should be made by the user. The fair use case would be significantly 
weakened if the service was seen to be making the copies on behalf of the user. If the 
service exercises sufficient volition to be found to have made the copies, any exception 
that the user may have been able to rely on may not apply, and liability for infringing the 
reproduction right may nonetheless accrue. 
 
Where each of these factors are present there is considerable scope to design services in ways 
that avoid remunerating rightholders while disrupting current and emerging markets for their 
content. The video on demand market appears to be the most vulnerable to this kind of 
‘Aereoizing’ of business models. For example, cable providers currently retransmit broadcast 
signals under a statutory license, but might be able to adopt an Aereo-style design to offer 
those signals to their users for free. The plaintiff broadcasters have claimed that Time Warner 
Cable has already “threatened to develop its own Aereo-like system to avoid compensating 
copyright owners and broadcasters for the use of their programming.”
104
 Since not all TV 
viewers (particularly those older than the “millennial” generation of “born digital” users, many 
of whom do not own television sets) would want to watch online (as the Aereo model requires), 
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some value would likely remain in cable providers being able to retransmit all broadcast 
material live under the compulsory license. However, the ability of individual subscribers to 
utilize Aereo-style services would certainly lessen the overall attraction of a cable package, thus 
making cable retransmission rights less valuable.   
Businesses that have previously been held liable might also be able to escape future liability by 
restructuring in accordance with these principles.
105
 For example, WPIX v ivi considered the 
liability of a service which transmitted broadcast television signals live over the internet for 
profit. The service had argued that it was entitled to a statutory retransmission license that 
would permit these activities. The district court and the Second Circuit on appeal ruled that ivi 
was not a “cable system” within the meaning of the Act and therefore not entitled to the 
statutory license, and enjoined ivi from continuing to transmit these broadcasts.
 106
 Such a 
service could be easily redesigned to adopt an Aereo-style architecture utilizing unique copies 
and unique transmissions from those copies to individual users. In order to maintain the “fair 
use” essential to avoiding primary or secondary liability for the making of the copies, the service 
may also have to redesign itself to offering access to localized geographic areas (ivi’s original 
retransmission model also offered programming from remote signals).
 107
 However, with these 
modifications, a strict application of Aereo would permit ivi to provide a retransmission service 
without any kind of license at all.
108
  
While not all previously-liable businesses can readily avoid liability by undergoing a process of 
Aereoization, some clearly can.  If the Cablevision/Aereo model of non-public transmissions 
from user-"made" copies survives, then many streaming-based enterprises will be completely 
unregulated (by copyright) so long as they can structure the streams as deriving from 
individualized user-"made" source copies that have been lawfully created, or otherwise 
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sufficiently mimic free consumer uses.  In our view, it is undesirable for the liability of a 
business to turn so much on its technological architecture rather than on any principled 
consideration of whether the use ought to be permitted without payment. 
We have suggested that in most cases four factors must be present for a business to design 
their way out of any obligation to remunerate rightholders for the content they supply. Outside 
those bounds, however, there is also some potential for clever manipulation of the law that 
might enable a business to provide access to content without paying for it. We offer two 
potential ways in which a business might be able to follow the Second Circuit’s roadmap to 
reach its desired destination in Copyrightfreeland. 
First, recall steps 3 and 4: the user-“made” copies must not be infringing.  If the user-“made” 
copy is not unlawful, then providing the means to make it cannot be contributory 
infringement.
109
  Suppose an Aereo-inspired service were to locate the servers that store the 
user-“made” copies outside of the U.S., for example in Spain.  If the copies were made without 
authorization, the copyright law they infringe may not be the U.S.’  Under traditional principles 
of territoriality,
110
 the copy may be localized where it was made, i.e., where the computer that 
stores it is located.   Hence, the users’ infringement liability would be determined by Spanish 
law.  If there is no primary infringement in the U.S., then, the Ninth Circuit has held,
111
 there 
can be no contributory infringement under U.S. law either.  Liability for contributory 
infringement would be subject to the same law that determines primary infringement.  As it 
turns out, however, Spanish courts have held that the doctrine of contributory infringement 
does not exist as a matter of Spanish copyright law.
112
  Thus, there may be no recourse with 
respect to the source copy for the individualized transmissions, and even if the transmissions 
are deemed to occur where the recipient is located,
113
 only one person is “capable of receiving” 
that transmission, and under the Second Circuit’s approach, the off-shore service from whose 
servers the transmission emanates would not be “publicly performing” the content it 
communicates to the user. 
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Second, and much more simply, it may be that businesses following the Aereo model can 
retransmit broadcast signals for free without even resorting to making individual copies. The 
source of this possibility is the Second Circuit’s admitted inability to distinguish between 
consumer uses of rooftop antennae and their uses of remote ones: 
It is beyond dispute that the transmission of a broadcast TV program received by an 
individual’s rooftop antenna to the TV in his living room is private, because only that 
individual can receive the transmission from that antenna, ensuring that the potential 
audience of that transmission is only one person. Plaintiffs have presented no reason 
why the result should be any different when that rooftop antenna is rented from Aereo 
and its signals transmitted over the internet: it remains the case that only one person 
can receive that antenna’s transmissions. Thus even without the creation of user-
associated copies, which under Cablevision means that Aereo’s transmissions are not 
public, there is significant reason to believe that Aereo’s system would not be creating 
public performances, since the entire chain of transmission from the time a signal is first 
received by Aereo to the time it generates an image the Aereo user sees has a potential 
audience of only one Aereo customer.
 114
  
This is the “longer cord” argument – that there is no difference between a consumer’s use of a 
rooftop antenna and her use of a remote antenna except the length of the cable. It also follows 
from the Second Circuit’s emphasis on the number of people “capable of receiving” any 
“particular transmission,” since the “particular transmission” can emanate from an individual 
receiving device as much as from an individual storage copy.  Absent any way of making a 
principled distinction between consumers transmitting performances to themselves from their 
own antenna on their roof, and the antenna they rent in a remote array, businesses may 
potentially be able to retransmit television signals without licence even without any time-
shifted copies. The key would simply be to ensure that their system architecture mimics rooftop 
antennae sufficiently closely.  
Implications of the Broadcasters’ Interpretation 
While the Second Circuit’s interpretation prompts trepidation for its impact on copyright 
industries, the broadcasters’ interpretation raises concerns about its possible effect on other 
technologies, particularly those providing cloud storage services. In today’s world, most content 
is protected by copyright, and for reasons of security and convenience, a great deal of that 
material is stored on remote servers which can be accessed by users online. Cloud storage is 
routinely offered to members of the public, as well as to private companies and educational 
institutions, by companies such as Dropbox, Amazon, Microsoft and Google.  
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Under the broadcasters’ interpretation of the transmit clause, the audience of each individual 
transmission is irrelevant: the focus is instead on whether there has been a public performance 
of the copyrighted work.   In this view, the clause effectively reads: 
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—  
. . . 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive [the performance of the underlying work] in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
The concerns of cloud computing users and providers arising from that interpretation can be 
illustrated by applying it to Dropbox and Amazon.  
Dropbox’s pitch is simple – it offers “your stuff, anywhere.”
115
 Dropbox copies and synchronizes 
content between multiple devices, and has been designed to make those processes as simple as 
possible for users.  The subscriber needs only to install the application, login, and start putting 
material in a folder. Dropbox then actively monitors that folder, automatically copies and 
synchronizes the user’s files across each of their devices via the internet once new content is 
added, and encrypts those files when they reach its servers.
116
 Subscribers may then access it 
from phones, tablets and anywhere with an internet connection. Accounts are private: only the 
account owner or a person he or she has expressly authorized may access the content stored 
within them. Amazon also offers remote storage facilities. For example, when a customer 
purchases a song from Amazon’s MP3 service, Amazon automatically saves a copy to the user’s 
section of its “Cloud Player” remote storage facility,
117
 from which users may download the file 
to any compatible device, or stream it directly.
118
 
Imagine that a user records a broadcast of a particular NFL football game, and, intending to 
watch it at a more convenient time, uploads that recording to her private Dropbox account. 
When she later streams the recorded broadcast from her Dropbox, is Dropbox engaging in an 
infringing public performance? When a subscriber streams the same legitimately-purchased 
phonorecord of a recorded song from Amazon’s Cloud Player, is Amazon triggering the public 
performance right?  
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Under the Second Circuit’s interpretation in Aereo, each transmission from Dropbox’s or 
Amazon’s remote storage to one of their users must necessarily be a private performance, 
because the potential audience of each transmission is that single individual (or in any event is 
not a ‘substantial number of persons beyond a circle of family and its social acquaintance’, 
which means the analysis doesn’t change if our Dropbox user has invited friends over to see the 
time-deferred broadcast of the football game, or for that matter, if she has authorized a limited 
number of persons to access content directly from her Dropbox storage). Thus, under the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation, cloud providers like Dropbox and Amazon are not obliged to 
clear public performance rights in order to provide their services. The Computer & 
Communications Industry Association and Internet Association describes this interpretation as 
“critical for cloud computing”.
119
 Under an interpretation of the transmit clause that inquires 
whether a “performance of the work” is transmitted to members of the public, however, 
Dropbox could potentially be engaged in a public performance. Thus, the broadcasters’ 
interpretation potentially imposes new public performance liability on providers whose 
technologies happen to involve transmissions of the same work to members of the public. This 
is the key reason why some see the Aereo case as so controversial and difficult to resolve.  
There may be ways of limiting the collateral damage of such a reading. For example, the 
broadcasters have sought to distinguish Aereo from Dropbox on the grounds that Dropbox does 
not supply or propose the streamed content.
120
 Admittedly, the Copyright Act does not specify 
that the entity which transmits must also be the entity which proposes the content, but that 
limitation may be argued to emerge from the context of the clause.  Moreover, the phrase “by 
any device or process” should not be divorced from the underlying assumption that the entity 
availing itself of new means of communication, including on-demand transmissions, would be 
the entity offering the programming in the first place.  All the examples in the legislative history 
point to the combined role of the “transmitting” entity as both proposing and conveying 
programming to the public, which could lend support to such a distinction, even though it is not 
incorporated into the text of the clause.
121
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Were such a distinction to be read into the transmit clause, it would preserve free from public 
performance infringement claims services such as Dropbox that store and playback user-posted 
content.  But what if the service is a hybrid, offering downloads of content to customers’ 
storage lockers as well as subsequent individualized streaming of that content?  Purveyors of 
recorded musical compositions, such as Amazon, sell downloads which they store for their 
customers in individualized storage spaces on the service’s servers, and then offer on-demand 
streaming from the storage copies.  In that case, would Amazon be engaged in a public 
performance when a user streamed a song, even though Dropbox would not? 
According the subsequent playback different treatment depending on whether the source copy 
was directly deposited by the seller or whether the user purchased the content as a CD which 
she subsequently ripped and posted to the storage locker seems at first blush as unconvincing 
an elevation of form over substance as the Second Circuit’s endorsement of routing public 
performances through thousands of individualized copies in order to “privatize” the 
transmissions.  
Stepping back from the minutiae of the storage arrangement, however, one might inquire 
whether these hybrid services are in fact streaming-on-demand services, with the price of the 
download effectively serving as the cost of the streaming service.  So that the storage copy, 
while less spurious than the Aereo copies, is essentially the vehicle for the on-demand 
streaming.  But it is not necessary to speculate about the “real” nature of these hybrid services, 
because the service must in any event obtain authorization to sell the downloads, and one may 
anticipate that the price of the license for the reproduction right will factor in the subsequent 
performances.  Moreover, at least with respect to musical compositions, these downloads are 
“digital phonorecord deliveries,” which, under the compulsory licensing mechanism established 
under section 115 of the Copyright Act, not only are compensated, but the rate-setting also 
takes into account the provision of subsequent playbacks.
122
  
However, since this distinction too is based on the way in which a given technology happens to 
operate, there is a risk that it may simply incentivize a new wave of opportunistic technological 
design. If the statute were read to require that the content and transmission providers must be 
one and the same in order for there to be a public performance, businesses would logically seek 
to separate out those functions in order to provide access without liability.   
It has also been argued that in light of the safe harbor against liability contained in § 512(c) of 
the Copyright Act, it is unproblematic for cloud storage providers such as Dropbox to face prima 
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facie liability for user streaming.
123
  An online service that hosts content posted by third parties 
has no duty to monitor the lawfulness of its subscribers’ postings, and incurs no liability if it 
lacked specific knowledge of the posted content.  It need only “respond expeditiously” to a 
proper take-down notice.
124
  Moreover, as the Second Circuit established in Viacom v. YouTube, 
the immunity applies not only to storage of user-posted content, but also to recoding it and 
streaming it back.
125
  
But consideration of how those safe harbors might apply in this instance raises concerns of its 
own. Premised on the starting point that the uploaded material is infringing, the safe harbors 
were designed to protect hosts who expeditiously remove it. In the case of Dropbox et al, the 
material uploaded by the user may well be non-infringing – created, for example, pursuant to a 
license or fair use. The language of § 512(c) does, however, appear broad enough to encompass 
takedowns of content whose initial posting was not infringing, but whose public performance 
would be infringing: the text covers removal or disabling access to “material that is claimed to 
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”
126
  The statute sets out infringing 
content and infringing activity in the alternative, and one might therefore contend that 
unauthorized public performance of the content is indeed an “infringing activity.”  Nonetheless, 
imposing new liability upon a host to remove such non-infringing content in order to avoid 
public performance liability is unprecedented
127
 and troubling. Moreover, because the § 512(c) 
safe harbor contemplates content provided by the user, it would not apply to the activities of 
services that lawfully distribute downloads to the user’s storage locker.
128
  Those services 
therefore would face unmitigated liability for subsequent unlicensed individualized streaming. 
As a result, neither the existence of such safe harbors, nor a focus on who provides the content 
to the user avoid all of the collateral damage that cloud providers fear were the broadcasters’ 
interpretation to prevail. 
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Is there an alternative reading of the transmit clause that would allow the court 
to reach a more principled outcome?  
The Second Circuit itself lamented the way in which its reasoning in Aereo resulted in 
technological design determining liability; it admitted: “Perhaps the application of the Transmit 
Clause should focus less on the technical details of a particular system and more on its 
functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . .  held that technical architecture matters.”
129
 
One of the key reasons Aereo is so controversial and difficult to resolve is because the 
interpretations put forward by both parties rely so much on technological design, leaving 
relatively little room for other considerations. Aereo’s interpretation dictates there is no public 
performance where the service structures the transmission so that it can be received by only 
one person, regardless of the nature of the relationship between that person and the content. 
The broadcasters’ interpretation might result in public performances wherever a service 
happens to make transmissions of the same works to multiple members of the public, 
regardless of the nature of the relationship between that person and the content, unless it is 
understood that the content provider and the transmission entity must be one and the same.   
The co-authors of this paper engaged in this collaboration out of shared concern that it is 
unprincipled and undesirable to read the transmit clause in a way that allows the design of the 
technology to dictate the result. Notably, we agree that debating the meaning of 
“performance” in the transmit clause (performance of the work v. particular transmission of a 
performance of the work) will not resolve the problem of interpreting the clause in a way that 
rejects the opportunistic technological manipulations of Cablevision and Aereo without 
endangering some legitimate cloud storage business models.  In considering the text of the 
transmit clause, one should not only address the meaning of “performance of the work,” but 
also the meaning of the phrase “to the public.”  We believe that focusing on the “public” to 
which these services communicate copyrighted content may show the way out of the impasse.   
Section 101 does not directly define the “public” for the purposes of the public performance 
right. It does specify that performances in a “place where a substantial number of persons 
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered” occur “publicly.”  
One might therefore infer that “the public” unites two criteria: (1) “a substantial number of 
persons” (2) who are not “a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances.”  This 
language, however, defines “the public” when the work is performed in public.  In the case of 
performances transmitted to the public for receipt in private places, caselaw and secondary 
authority establish that a “substantial number of persons” need not in fact have received the 
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transmission; rather it suffices that the performance of the work be offered to “members of the 
public.”
130
  
This exegesis suggests that, even if one subscribed to the Second Circuit’s understanding of 
“performance of the work” as restricted to a particular transmission that communicates the 
performance, that understanding does not necessarily make the transmission private. While “a 
substantial number of persons” cannot receive the particular transmission, and the 
transmission might therefore be thought to be private, in fact the requirement of a “substantial 
number of persons” pertains to performances in public, not to the public.  The statute tells us 
that a communication of a performance by transmission to the members of the public may be 
achieved “by means of any device or process.”  We should focus our gaze not on how the 
communication occurs (whether by a single transmission; multiple transmissions from a single 
source, or multiple transmissions from multiple sources) but to whom it is offered.  Where the 
service is offering performances of copyrighted content to the public by means of individualized 
transmissions, any particular transmission will therefore be sent to a “member of the public” 
and may nonetheless be public in nature.  The public to which the performances are offered 
remains the same whatever the “device or process” used to communicate the content. 
 
The Way Forward – Giblin’s view 
Why Aereo is so important – and so controversial 
Aereo’s process involves making both copies and transmissions, but the transmit clause is 
taking center stage in this litigation. That is because the plaintiff broadcasters would prefer not 
to open the Pandora’s Boxes that stand between them and a successful claim for infringing 
reproductions. Box #1: Cablevision’s “volition” standard suggests that it is Aereo’s users who 
make the copies. Box #2: Sony tells us that home time-shifting of free broadcast television is fair 
use. Overturning either holding, but particularly the latter, would be difficult, and broadcasters 
may well prefer the existing uncertainty over the risk of a decision that might confirm the reach 
of these holdings to Aereo-like technologies. Understandably, therefore, the broadcasters 
would prefer to bypass those difficult battles altogether by persuading the Court that Aereo is 
infringing the public performance right instead.  
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The broadcasters’ analysis in that regard is beguilingly simple. Starting from the assumption 
that Aereo is the relevant actor, it reasons that Aereo is offering and transmitting performances 
of works, and that, given its commercial relationship with its users, it is doing so “to the public”. 
Et voilà – the service provider is directly liable without any need to inquire into the nature of 
the use itself, and whether consumers do – or should – have the right to engage in it for free.  
But of course, that analysis doesn’t just capture Aereo. Imported wholesale, the broadcasters’ 
interpretation has the potential to threaten all kinds of businesses, technologies and uses. 
Virtually all content is protected by copyright, and the shift away from local to cloud-based 
storage means that it is routinely transmitted online. The legal reception for cloud storage 
providers in particular might have been much less hospitable had the broadcasters’ 
interpretation of the transmit clause prevailed in 2008. That is why so many consumer 
advocates and technologists are concerned about this case: motivated not necessarily by 
sympathy for Aereo, but for fear of how the broadcasters’ reading would affect other uses and 
developments.  
A number of law professors have argued that the case should be decided on the reproduction 
right, rather than the public performance right, ensuring that crucial fair use arguments get 
aired, and avoiding collateral damage for other technologies which happen to transmit 
content.
131
 Though I agree that these considerations are important, the potential for harmful 
exploitation of the existing law – particularly the Second Circuit’s suggestion that there may be 
no public performance liability for providing online television streaming via individual antenna 
under the public performance right even where copies are not made as part of the process – 
suggests that this is the right time for the Supreme Court to find a more principled reading of 
the transmit clause, without necessarily taking on the predicate reproduction right issues. It 
may do so by revisiting the meaning of the words “to the public”, and thereby developing a 
more nuanced framework for distinguishing between public and private performances.  
What does it mean to be “to the public”? 
Compared to some other jurisdictions, the U.S. case law regarding what it means for a 
performance to be “to the public” is surprisingly sparse. Most notably to date, the Northern 
District of California considered whether the electronic delivery of video signals to hotel rooms 
from a bank of cassette players in the hotel’s equipment room, upon request from a guest, 
amounted to transmissions to “the public.”
132
 The hotel at issue in On Command Video had 
structured its service so that no two guests could simultaneously view the content from the 
same cassette.  The district court, following Ninth Circuit precedent, recognized that 
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performances in hotel rooms did not occur in public places,
133
 but held that the video 
transmissions were indeed “to the public” for the purposes of the transmit clause because “the 
relationship between the transmitter of the performance . . . and the audience . . . is a 
commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place.”
134
  Paul Goldstein has 
agreed that the relationship between the sender and the recipient is vital in determining 
whether a transmission is “to the public”: “In the case of a transmission to a guest house, the 
relationship between the homeowner and the recipients of the transmission is not one 
between an individual and the public, rather is between an individual and his friends or family. 
By contrast, the relationship between a trailer court manager and guests in the court is one 
between an individual and the public, as it is in the case of a hotel and its guests.”
135
  
Judge Chin adopted On Command when he determined Cablevision at first instance,
136
 and 
further highlighted the importance of the relationship between the parties in his Aereo dissent. 
There he reasoned that “a transmission to anyone other than oneself or an intimate relation is 
a communication to a ‘member[] of the public,” because it is not in any sense “private.”
137
 
Thus, Aereo’s transmissions were “to the public” because they were being disseminated to 
“paying strangers”; the fact that the potential audience of each transmission was restricted to a 
single member of the public was irrelevant.
138
 In each of these cases the emphasis has been 
squarely on the relationship between the sender and recipient of the performance to 
determine whether it has been made “to the public”.  
Although these authorities have focused on commerciality, that factor has not been ruled to be 
dispositive. Outside these authorities, very little consideration has been given to the meaning of 
the words, “to the public”. The Second Circuit in Cablevision criticized On Command’s reading of 
those words,
139
 but did not itself grapple with how to distinguish between public and private 
performances: in light of its finding that the RS-DVR transmissions were not “public” (because 
they were transmitted to each subscriber using their own copies) it found that it was not 
necessary to “analys[e] the contours of that phrase in great detail.”
140
 But exploring the 
contours of that phrase is precisely what we need to do to resolve the current tangle. How 
might it be read to help us more effectively distinguish between performances that are private 
and those that are public?  
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Can the Aussies help? 
On this point the Australian approach may be of assistance.  Whereas US authorities to date 
have largely focused on the relationship between the service provider and the audience (and, 
more recently, the relationship between the source copy of the transmission and the audience), 
the Australian law targets the relationship between the owner of the copyright and the 
audience.
141
 Thus, the relevant question is whether the recipient of the performance is a 
member of what is described as the “copyright owner’s public”, that is, “the group which the 
copyright owner would . . . contemplate as its public for the performance of its work.”
142
 This 
approach originates in a line of UK cases which, in determining whether a performance was “in 
public,” focused on the harm the act causes to the author of the work.
143
 Proceeding on the 
basis that that is the crucial consideration, the Australian law has developed to recognize “the 
relevant ‘public’ [a]s the group which the copyright owner would otherwise contemplate as its 
public for the performance of its work.”
144
 Thus, the essence of a performance “to the public” 
in Australian law is that it is occurring in circumstances where the owner is entitled to expect 
payment for the work’s authorized performance.
145
  
The key authority is the 1997 decision in Telstra v APRA. There, Australia’s court of ultimate 
authority was asked to determine whether the streaming of music to individual cell phone 
callers placed on hold constituted a broadcast “to the public”.
146
 In that case, as in Aereo, the 
recipient of each transmission was potentially a single individual. Was the transmission of 
copyright-protected music a transmission to the copyright owner’s public? Emphasizing the 
nature of the audience, the High Court held that it was: 
Lying behind the concept of the copyright owner's public is recognition of the fact that 
where a work is performed in a commercial setting, the occasion is unlikely to be private 
or domestic and the audience is more appropriately to be seen as a section of the 
public. It is in a commercial setting that an unauthorised performance will ordinarily be 
to the financial disadvantage of the owner's copyright in a work because it is in such a 
setting that the owner is entitled to expect payment for the work's authorised 
performance. In this case it is not so much the preparedness of the audience of music-
on-hold to pay to hear the works were it not for their unauthorised performance that is 
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significant. That simple analysis belongs to an age where communications were less 
technologically advanced and business and marketing techniques were less developed. 
Rather, it is the preparedness of those who wish the music-on-hold to be played to bear 
the cost of the arrangement which provides the key, for it reveals the commercial 
character of the broadcast and the commercial deprivation suffered by the copyright 
owner. Callers on hold constitute the copyright owner's public, not because they 
themselves would be prepared to pay to hear the music, but because others are 
prepared to bear the cost of them having that facility. For the performance of the music 
to that audience the copyright owner would expect to receive payment, even if not from 
the members of the audience. For these reasons, we conclude that when the works 
were transmitted to persons using mobile telephones when placed on hold, in each of 
the three situations revealed by the evidence, they were broadcast [to the public.]
147
 
 Thus, the transmissions were indeed to the copyright owner’s public – because of the nature of 
the relationship between the copyright owner and the audience, rather than the relationship 
between the performer and the audience. 
  
How might this notion of the “copyright owner’s public” operate in US law? 
If the transmit clause’s reference to “the public” were to follow the Australian approach of 
focusing on the relationship between the recipient of the performance and the owner of the 
copyright, technological design would cease to be determinative, and courts would be able to 
make more principled distinctions between public and private performances, and a great deal 
of the collateral damage threatened by the interpretations proposed by Aereo and the 
broadcasters could be avoided.  
If we read the transmit clause as referring to the copyright owner’s public, it would require us 
to examine the nature of the use to identify whether the communication was one for which the 
copyright owner could reasonably expect a royalty. If, for example, the user has an express or 
implied license to engage in the copyright-triggering act, or a fair use privilege to do so, the 
owner could not reasonably expect a royalty, and therefore the performance would not be 
“public”. If however the user was accessing protected content without the benefit of any 
license or exception, that would likely to be a circumstance where the copyright owner could 
reasonably expect a royalty and thus be a communication “to the public”. The same analysis 
would apply regardless of whether the transmission is limited to a single individual or the public 
at large. 
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The advantages of such a reading become apparent upon application.  
When a user uploads content to her Dropbox, and later streams it back to herself, whether or 
not she is a member of the copyright owner’s public would depend on whether she has an 
express or implied licence to enjoy those performances (or some fair use right to do so). If the 
use is permitted for any of those reasons, then the copyright owner could not reasonably 
expect a royalty, and the transmission would not be “to the public”.  Crucially, an individual 
may be a member of the copyright owner’s public even when she is making a transmission to 
herself. For example, if the uploaded content is an infringing copy of a television show, that is 
clearly a circumstance where the copyright owner would be entitled to expect a royalty, and 
the user would thus be a member of the copyright owner’s public. But if she is streaming a song 
that she has a licence or fair use privilege to play, the different relationship between the 
audience and the copyright owner results in a finding that the user is not a member of the right 
holder’s public. In these two examples the technology, audience and transmitter are identical, 
and the different outcomes follow from the different relationships between the copyright 
owner and the audience.   
This formulation allows for identical transmissions to be “to the public” when made to one 
audience but not to another. For example, if a music talent agent streamed to herself a song 
shared with her by a prospective client, she would not be a member of that musician’s “public”, 
because she would have an implied license to play the track without the payment of any 
royalty. The analysis on these facts would be identical whether the streaming occurred from 
her local hard drive, from a storage provider who only provided hosting, or one which also 
proposed or sold the content. But if the same song was streamed by an individual who had no 
licence or fair use privilege to do so, she would be a member of the copyright owner’s public. In 
each case the focus is on the nature of the use rather than the particular design of the 
technology that is used to achieve it.  
This reading avoids the unsatisfactory and anomalous possibility of storage providers having 
different liability depending on whether they provided the content and then the storage, or the 
storage alone, and adapts flexibly to different uses even when the technology remains the 
same. By focusing on the relationship between the recipient and the copyright owner, it also 
promotes technological neutrality: the user’s right to experience the performance is likely to be 
the same regardless of whether she streams it from her laptop’s hard drive or her private cloud 
storage. However, this interpretation is also sufficiently flexible to recognise that that might not 
always be the case. For example, one of the crucial factors considered in any fair use analysis is 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. If the 
added convenience of a cloud-based service results in undue interference with the copyright 
owner’s market, that may tip the balance against the user and potentially result in a different 
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outcome. In each case however the crucial consideration is the relationship between the 
audience and the copyright owner, not the technical operation of the system. 
What would this reading mean for Aereo? Whether or not the performances are “public” under 
this reading is likely to come down to whether, in all the circumstances, they amount to fair 
uses by the recipient. If not, the recipient will be one of the copyright owner’s public and 
engaged in a public performance. If there is such a right however, the performance will not be 
“to the public”.  Whether or not Aereo usage is “fair” has not yet been developed in the legal 
record, but it is far from being a slam dunk. Read carefully, Sony was far from a blanket 
authorization of any and all consumer copying of television broadcasts, and Aereo is readily 
distinguishable on a number of bases including the financial impact its use has on rightholders, 
its addition of place-shifting functionality that competes with licensed markets, and the general 
lack of “friction” in the copying process. If Aereo’s users had no fair use right or licence to 
engage in the performances, they would be public.  
The proposed reading finally provides a mechanism to explain why consumer uses of Aereo’s 
remote antennae might be treated differently from consumer uses of antennae located on their 
own roofs. It has been argued by some commentators that the only difference between legally 
enjoying broadcast TV via your home antenna and doing so via Aereo is “the length of the 
cable”.
148
 After all, there is a transmission from the antenna to the receiving device no matter 
where that antenna is located. As noted above, the majority of the Second Circuit in Aereo 
admitted that it was unable to distinguish between the two cases, leading to that suggestion 
that online retransmission engineered to give an independent antenna to each individual might 
be non-remunerable even in the absence of timeshifted copies.
149
 However, if the inquiry is 
whether each of those transmissions is “to the public” within the definition proposed here, 
those uses may indeed be distinguished in a principled way. Under this conception, users 
transmitting the free-to-air broadcast signals they receive via their rooftop antennae to their 
living room television sets could be engaged in a public performance – if, in doing so, they were 
members of the “copyright owner’s public”.  However, since users have a very clear license to 
engage in that use, the copyright owner has no reasonable expectation of a royalty; thus, those 
transmissions must not be “to the public”. In the case of signals transmitted by Aereo’s remote 
antennae however, there may be no implied license from broadcasters and, as sketched above, 
the fair use case may not hold up. Were it accepted that users had no license or fair use 
privilege to retransmit signals from remote antennae, such transmissions may be to the 
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“copyright owner’s public.” Again, the difference lies in the nature of the use, not the nature of 
the technology. Broadcasters are willing for individuals to transmit signals from rooftop 
antennae to their television sets, but see services that offer transmissions from remote 
antennae to laptops as unduly interfering with the potential market for, or value of, their 
copyrighted works, particularly with regard to cable retransmission and video-on-demand 
rights.  
In cases where a service has been put to infringing use, the provider may have liability under 
existing theories of secondary infringement. For example, were consumers who transmitted 
near-live television via Aereo found to do so in their capacities as members of the copyright 
owner’s public, those transmissions would amount to infringing public performances. Aereo’s 
involvement in setting up the transmission system and encouraging its use would likely result in 
liability for inducing those infringements, and may also give rise to vicarious liability.
150
   
There is of course a certain circularity in this analysis. In the event that there is a public 
performance, that amounts to the doing of one of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, which 
ordinarily gives rise to an entitlement to payment. If the way in which we determine whether 
such a performance has occurred is with reference to whether the rightholder is entitled to 
payment, the analysis may start to look like a snake that is eating its tail. However, that 
circularity provides us with a mechanism for confirming that it is indeed appropriate to impose 
an obligation to pay for the use. A law that provides that a performance is public when 
addressed to “members of the public” in the dictionary sense is a very blunt instrument in our 
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transmission-filled, online world. As we have seen in the context of cloud storage providers, a 
performance might easily be received by members of the public in circumstances where they 
had a license or fair use privilege to do so, i.e. where they are not members of the copyright 
owner’s public. By re-focusing the analysis on the relationship between the copyright owner 
and the recipient in determining whether the performance is “public”, this reading incorporates 
a safety check that prevents overreaching by ruling out certain transactions which should not 
be in the copyright owner’s control. Although there is circularity here, it is useful redundancy 
that encourages fuller consideration of the relevant facts, and transforms a blunt instrument 
into one capable of much more nuance.  
My co-author disagrees about the desirability of incorporating fair use considerations into the 
public performance analysis. In my view however, such considerations are central to the 
concept: a copyright owner cannot reasonably expect a royalty in the case of an 
unremunerated fair use, and thus the user is not a member of their public in the case of that 
use. In addition, I see this as being a vital feature of this proposed reading in light of the U.S. 
law’s distinction between fair uses by users and fair uses on behalf of users. The law has 
traditionally operated less favorably to commercial service providers who do an act on a user’s 
behalf than it would to the user herself.
151
 Thus, a copy shop may be liable for making infringing 
copies, even if the making of those copies would have amounted to educational fair use had it 
been carried out by the ultimate user on her own behalf.
152
 In one such case the Sixth Circuit 
observed that “courts have … properly rejected attempts by for-profit users to stand in the 
shoes of their customers making nonprofit or noncommercial uses.”
153
 In a subsequent case 
involving the sale of karaoke discs, it reiterated that “the end-user’s utilization of the product is 
largely irrelevant; instead, the focus is on whether alleged infringer’s use is transformative 
and/or commercial.”
154
 Thus, in defending against an allegation of public performance 
infringement, a storage provider like Dropbox may not be able to rely on the user having a fair 
use right to stream the content. As more and more transactions occur online, and users 
continue to shift from local to cloud-based computing environments, this distinction threatens 
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to seriously erode fair use. By requiring courts to consider the relationship between the 
recipient of the performance and the copyright owner in determining whether a performance is 
transmitted, those rights continue to be protected.   
By developing the meaning of the phrase “to the public”, it is possible to make principled 
distinctions between public and private performances regardless of how far away the receiving 
equipment is, who it is owned by, or how individualized the transmission.  Such a reading would 
restore to courts the ability to decide whether the performance is public, and not leave the 
outcome to technological happenstance.  
 
The Way Forward – Ginsburg’s View: Who is “the public” and what is it paying 
for? 
The two authors agree that the concept of the relevant public “to” which the service offers and 
transmits the works may be the key to a more principled reading of the transmit clause (which 
would permit reversal in Aereo without endangering legitimate cloud storage models).  But we 
differ on how to ascertain who that public is.  Ginsburg does not fully understand the 
“copyright owner’s public,” finding the concept both circular and horse/cart-inverting because 
it appears to make prima facie violations of the public performance right turn on a fair use 
inquiry.   
Going back to our common referent in On Command Video, however, can lead to another 
approach to identifying the relevant “public” for public performances by transmission.  On 
Command underscored the difference between a performance IN public, and a performance by 
transmission TO the public.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Professional Real Estate required the 
On Command court to confront the distinction; the appellate court there held that a hotel’s 
“rental” of videocassettes to its customers for viewing in their rooms was not a public 
performance because the guest rooms, once occupied, were not “open to the public.”
155
  The 
Northern District of California acknowledged that the hotel’s guests did not view the 
videocassettes’ content in public, but ruled that the hotel’s communication of the content of 
the videocassettes to one customer at a time came within the scope of the statute’s second 
definition of ”to perform publicly”: 
On Command transmits movie performances directly under the language of the 
definition. The system "communicates" the motion picture "images and sounds" by a 
"device or process" -- the equipment and wiring network -- from a central console in a 
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hotel to individual guest rooms, where the images and sounds are received "beyond the 
place from which they are sent." The fact that hotel guests initiate this transmission by 
turning on the television and choosing a video is immaterial. 
On Command's video transmissions are also "to the public" for the purposes of the 
transmit clause. Hotel guests watching a video movie in their room through On 
Command's system are not watching it in a "public place" but they are nonetheless 
members of "the public."  This is because the relationship between the transmitter of 
the performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a commercial, 
"public" one regardless of where the viewing takes place. The non-public nature of the 
place of the performance has no bearing on whether or not those who enjoy the 
performance constitute "the public" under the transmit clause.
156
 
Thus, the elements that converged to support the Northern District of California’s 
determination that the hotel had transmitted copyrighted works “to the public” were: 
The occupation of the hotel rooms by “members of the public” (the hotel’s guests were drawn 
from the general public, any of whom could have occupied private rooms) 
The hotel was transmitting the motion pictures to its guests on their request 
The commercial relationship between the hotel and its guests. 
The Second Circuit distinguished On Command on the ground that the individualized 
transmissions emanated from a central source copy,
157
 but we have seen that this distinction 
does not withstand textual analysis.
158
  Under On Command, then, transmissions of 
performances of works to a paying public, wherever and whenever the members of the public 
receive the transmissions, are public performances.  But if those are the elements of a public 
performance by transmission, how can On Command avoid condemning cloud storage services, 
such as those provided by Dropbox or Amazon?  The answer may lie in what the members of 
the public are paying for.  In On Command, members of the public paid to view particular works 
offered by the hotel.  The hotel gave its guests a choice of movies, and then transmitted them 
individually on request.  This is classic pay-per-view.  It is very unlikely that the On Command 
court’s analysis would have changed if, instead of transmitting from a centralized videocassette, 
the hotel had purchased a library of videocassettes for each guest room, and confined 
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transmissions from each cassette to its dedicated room – in effect, a lower-tech version of the 
Cablevision roadmap.  Whatever the “device or process” by which the hotel offered to transmit 
the content it offered its guests, the guests were paying to receive that content “in a place 
beyond the place from which [it was] sent.”  In this respect, my analysis approaches my co-
author’s focus on the copyright owner’s right to control the offering of the content. 
Storage locker models such as Dropbox are also transmitting content to members of the public 
(their subscribers) when they playback the files requested by the users.  But unlike On 
Command-style pay-per-view, the service for which the members of the public are paying is not 
the opportunity to receive transmissions of particular works offered by the service, but rather 
to store whatever content the users post, whatever its source, and make it accessible remotely.  
Dropbox’s customers pay the same subscription fees whatever the content they store and 
access.  The “commercial relationship” between the service and the consumer does not pertain 
to the delivery of pre-identified content.  Thus, while there is a public that pays in dollars or in 
subjection to advertising
159
 (or other costs of “free” commercial services), the public is not 
specifically paying for any given copyrighted works. 
What about hybrid content delivery and storage services, such as that provided by Amazon?  
When the members of the public purchase a download, they are paying for specific content, 
but in the US copyright system, which even with respect to digital files separates rights of 
reproduction and distribution on the one hand from rights of public performance on the 
other,
160
 the rights that the members of the public are paying the service to exercise are 
reproduction and distribution rights, not public performance rights.  When the members of the 
public request playback of the same files, they are identifying particular content initially 
provided by the service (unlike pure storage models), but the commercial relationship does not 
necessarily correspond to the performance of content supplied by the service.  That is, if the 
service stores and plays back not only content that it placed in the customer’s locker, but also 
content the user acquired or posted from other sources, its playback feature may more closely 
resemble Dropbox’s, particularly if the price the user pays for playback remains constant 
whatever the content performed.  Admittedly, there is economic value in providing playback 
together with a download, even when the playback is undifferentiated with regard to content 
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not downloaded from the playback service.  But, as suggested earlier, that value may be 
captured in the price negotiated (or set by compulsory license) for the initial download.  An 
approach that inquires “who is the public and what is it paying for” would not, in the case of 
hybrid services, disaggregate the subsequent playback from the initial content delivery, and 
thus has the merit of avoiding “double-dipping” - requiring the copyright licensee to pay 
separately for what, commercially, seems a single act of exploitation. 
As applied to Aereo, this approach would bring that service’s activities squarely within the 
public performance right.  Aereo’s subscribers – members of the public – are paying to receive 
transmissions of copyrighted works.  Aereo is offering its subscribers broadcast television 
programming via an internet connection; however simple or complex the “device or process” 
by which Aereo provides performances of that content, there is no doubt what its customers 
are paying for.  Aereo does not (and could not) promote its service as offering “your stuff, 
anywhere;”
161
 it is urging its public to “Watch Live TV Online.”
162
  
To sum up, a service that offers performances of copyrighted works to members of the public 
on an on-demand basis is publicly performing those works by transmission, at least when the 
service’s customers are paying (in money or in kind, for example, by exposure to advertising or 
by providing personal data) to receive performances of those works.  This solution is 
technologically neutral: the “device or process” by which performances of the works are 
communicated to the members of the public, whether the on-demand transmission to a 
member of the public derives from a centralized or an individual source copy, is irrelevant.  
Finally, an individual who makes available performances of copyrighted works, either directly or 
through access to her “cloud” storage, to members of her family or personal friends or 
colleagues, is not performing those works “publicly” because she is providing access to a 
defined circle of recipients; she is not offering the content to “members of the public.”
163
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copyright violation because Mr. Hapless did not transmit the recording ‘to the public.’”). 
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Conclusions 
In a world where so many routine transactions involve online transmissions, Aereo presents a 
serious challenge. The technology has been carefully and cleverly designed to exploit the 
contours of the copyright law (as interpreted by the Second Circuit in Cablevision) to proffer 
what many have perceived to be an all-or-nothing choice: permit Aereo to design its way out of 
an obligation to remunerate rightholders, or impose unacceptable collateral damage on 
essential technologies like cloud storage. These choices are neither palatable nor inevitable. 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that technological design need not dictate the 
application of the transmit clause. Rather, developing the meaning of the words, “to the public” 
produces more principled alternative readings of the transmit clause, either of which allows 
courts to enable copyright’s exclusive rights to remain effective without discouraging 
innovation. 
  
 
